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FROM TEXAS GULF SULPHUR TO
LAUDATO SI’: MINING EQUITABLE
PRINCIPLES FROM INSIDER TRADING LAW
Michael J. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit declared that all inves-
tors trading on impersonal exchanges should have equal access to material
information, and therefore anyone who possesses material inside informa-
tion must either turn it over to the investing public or not trade. The broad
reach of that insider trading prohibition sent shock waves throughout the
financial markets and encountered significant judicial resistance from the
Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court initially rejected the insider trading prohi-
bition announced in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the fundamental equitable trad-
ing principles underlying that decision have endured. This article shows
that TGS was more than a case about insider trading. It established the
fundamental inequity and unfairness of misappropriating resources that
are meant to be shared. This article will trace the evolution of those equita-
ble principles from TGS to the Supreme Court’s current insider trading
law. I also suggest that those principles have much in common with both
the teachings of Pope Francis in Laudato Si’ and with the latest research
regarding sustainable economic productivity within a robust capitalist
system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS), the Second Circuit declaredthat all investors trading on impersonal exchanges should have “rela-tively equal access to material information,” and therefore anyone
who possesses material inside information must either turn it over to the
investing public, or not trade.1 As predicted by Judge Waterman, who
authored the opinion for an en banc court, it was “going to have a hell of
an impact on the financial world.”2
Indeed, before 1968, no securities statute, regulation, or governing pre-
cedent appeared to mandate that investors ensure that other investors
have equal access to material, non-public information before they could
trade on the open market.3 What TGS did was give judicial endorsement
to the view that insider trading is inherently inequitable—no matter who
does it. TGS deemed insider trading to be a “constructive fraud” on the
market, and thus subject to the securities laws’ anti-fraud provisions.4
Constructive fraud is an equitable concept that enables a court to con-
strue that “a person or entity has gained an unfair advantage over an-
other by deceitful or unfair methods.”5 TGS fashioned this rule of equity
to address the perceived unfairness of insider trading: that no one—no
director, officer, fiduciary, or otherwise—may trade on the basis of inside
information without disclosing it first, and if that person cannot disclose
it, then he or she simply cannot trade.6
The magnitude of applying TGS’s disclose-or-abstain rule to all market
traders—not just fiduciaries or those under some traditional common-law
obligation—is evident from how quickly the courts, regulators, and com-
mentators tried to retreat from it. Almost immediately, there were reser-
vations about TGS’s application to everyone. Did the securities laws
really intend to prohibit market trading by any person who comes to have
material information not yet in the public domain? The Supreme Court
quickly said no, and seemed to put to rest TGS’s sweeping application of
its disclose-or-abstain rule.7
1. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
2. Alan M. Weinberger, Forever Young: Texas Gulf Sulphur Rules at Fifty, 45 SEC.
REG. L. J. 23 n.2 (Spring 2017).
3. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Equal Access to Information: The Fraud at the Heart
of Texas Gulf Sulphur 7–13 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 17-14, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014977 [http://perma.cc/
5KM6-3AJN].
4. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 855.
5. See Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
6. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
7. See infra Part III.
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But TGS’s core principle, that insider trading is inherently inequita-
ble—a constructive fraud on the market no matter who does it—has en-
dured. In fact, the Supreme Court, the federal appellate courts, and the
SEC continue to push the limits of insider trading jurisprudence beyond
the limits of traditional common law fiduciary duties, getting closer and
closer to TGS’s sweeping equitable scope.8
In this article, I trace the evolution of equitable principles from TGS to
current insider trading law. Although the Supreme Court appears to have
initially limited the reach of TGS’s equitable trading principles, the Court
actually has built its insider trading doctrine on the foundation of the
equitable trading principles established by TGS. I also suggest in this arti-
cle that those equitable trading principles are aligned with both the teach-
ings of Pope Francis in Laudato Si’ and with the latest research regarding
sustainable economic productivity within a robust capitalist system.
II. THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES IN TGS
A. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR AND THE KIDD CREEK MINE
Texas Gulf Sulphur’s discovery of the ore deposits that would eventu-
ally become the Kidd Creek Mine was spectacular. In the late 1950s,
Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) began exploring the “Canadian Shield,” a
well-known source of precious mineral deposits in Eastern Canada.9 Af-
ter two years of searching, TGS’s aerial magnetic imaging detected vari-
ous anomalies often associated with the presence of ore-bearing rock.10
For five days in November, 1963, a team of TGS employees drilled a sam-
ple from the land.11 From the sample alone, “the glimmer of metals was
visible to crew members as the . . . core containing ore sample was pulled
from the ground.”12 In fact, one of the geologists who saw the sample was
so excited by the results that he “jeeped 12 miles to a motel . . . where he
called his immediate superior . . . at his home at midnight.”13 The next
month, TGS sent the sample from Canada to a lab in Utah for a chemical
assay. The results of that assay “were so remarkable that neither [TGS’s
electrical engineer and geophysicist], an experienced geophysicist, nor
four other TGS expert witnesses, had ever seen or heard of a comparable
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843. More thorough discussions of the facts in
TGS can be found elsewhere. Professor Alan Weinberger, for instance, mines not only past
U.S. court records, but also the legal proceedings in Canada. His discussion of the back-
ground in TGS is one of the most extensive and considered discussions to date. See gener-
ally Weinberger, supra note 2.
10. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258
F. Supp. 262, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (“[T]he geophysical survey conducted prior to the drill-
ing . . . indicated a ‘first class’ anomaly over a length of more than 1,000 feet”).
11. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. at 271.
12. Weinberger, supra note 2. See also Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. at 282 (“There
is no doubt that the drill core . . . was unusually good and that it excited the interest and
speculation of those who knew about it.”).
13. Weinberger, supra note 2.
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initial exploratory drill hole in a base metal deposit.”14 The sample, as
described by others, was “one of the most impressive drill holes com-
pleted in modern times” and “just beyond your wildest imagination.”15
Experts for TGS, however, would later testify that the sample of the land
and the initial assay findings were not necessarily reliable indicators of a
significant ore-body that would make up an actual mine.16
Nevertheless, with the mere prospect of such a find, TGS employees
immediately moved to cover their discovery.17 The company stopped
drilling. TGS’s president told the drill team to keep the find “confidential
and undisclosed even as to other officers, directors, and employees of
TGS.”18 Professor Alan Weinberger captures the full extent of what TGS
employees did to disguise the potential mine. TGS employees:
ordered that the drilling be suspended and the discovery site camou-
flaged. Tractor tracks were covered by branches. Trees were planted
over the original drill hole . . . . To confuse pilots working for com-
peting mining companies who might fly overhead, the drill team set
up an identical camp at the opposite end of the township.19
And for the next several months, TGS employees negotiated with nearby
landowners for ownership or mining rights under strict instructions that
they were not to tip off any owner to the potential find.20 TGS finally
bought up all the land it needed by March 1964 and had begun drilling
additional samples to confirm its find.21
Meanwhile, however, rumors started circulating in nearby mining com-
munities that TGS had hit on a valuable find.22 Eventually, local papers
picked up the rumors which made their way to the New York Times and
the New York Herald Tribune.23 TGS moved to silence this scuttlebutt,
issuing an explicit press release on April 13, 1964: “The drilling done to
date has not been conclusive. . . . When we have progressed to the point
where reasonable and logical conclusions can be made, TGS will issue a
definite statement. . . .”24 By the time TGS had made this statement, it
had drilled five different samples and received the results for one chemi-
cal assay confirming the presence of ore bodies and numerous promising
14. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843.
15. Id. at 850–51.
16. See Weinberger, supra note 2.
17. See id.
18. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843.
19. See Weinberger, supra note 2; see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp.
262, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (“[F]ollowing the usual practice in the mining industry, security
measures were put into effect. Further drilling on the anomaly was suspended and mem-
bers of the exploration group were instructed to keep the results of K-55-1 confidential.
The drill rig at the site of K-55-1 was moved away and cut saplings were stuck in the
ground in the area of the hole to conceal its location. A second drill hole (K-55-2) was
drilled off the anomaly in order to produce a barren core.”).
20. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843.
21. Id. at 844.
22. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. at 285.
23. Id.
24. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 845.
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visual estimates of the core.25 But on that very same day, TGS invited a
reporter from one of the Canadian publications to the Kidd Creek mine,
allowed him to speak with various TGS employees, and gave him the
drilling records to date.26 The reporter prepared an article stating that a
“major new zinc-copper-silver mine is definitely in the making.”27 TGS
held this article for three days.28
Then, on April 16, TGS announced that, based on its drilling data, it
had struck at least 25 million tons of ore and allowed the Canadian re-
porter to release his story.29 Today, that site is home to the world’s deep-
est mine below sea level, contains precious minerals worth $2 billion, and
is singlehandedly credited for saving the Canadian town of Timmins.30
Before TGS announced its discovery to the investing public, its senior
managers and employees who knew about the potential mine began to
take advantage.31 The president of TGS, directors on the board, and se-
nior executives started scooping up TGS stock from the moment the com-
pany pulled the first sample from the ground.32 One of TGS’s directors
actually left the April 16 press briefing to order more stock.33 Some TGS
geologists and engineers—and their wives—were also buying what they
could after the company drilled the initial sample in November 1963—a
year before the public announcement.34 And they tipped off friends and
relatives, who in turn touted the stock to others.35 In all, before TGS
drilled the initial sample, the defendants owned 1,135 TGS shares, but by
the time TGS announced its find to the public, the defendants owned
8,235 shares and 12,300 calls.36
TGS’s stock price shot “from about $18 per share at the time the ore
body was discovered to more than $31 at the time the discovery was made
public.”37 By the end of the next month, the stock was trading at $58 per
share.38 In fact, TGS “was the most actively traded stock on the New
York Stock Exchange in 1964.”39
25. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. at 271–72.
26. Id. at 285.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 846.
30. See Weinberger, supra note 2. One of the TGS employees who discovered the
orebody that would eventually become the Kidd Creek Mine in the town of Timmins was
inducted into the Canadian Mining Hall of Fame, and another TGS employee is considered
a local folk hero. Id.
31. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. at 281–95.
32. See id. at 273.
33. Id. at 288.
34. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 891.
35. Id. at 841 n.4.
36. Id. at 844.
37. Weinberger, supra note 2.
38. Id.
39. See id.
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B. CADY, ROBERTS AND THE SEC TGS PROSECUTION
The attention surrounding TGS and its securities during this time was
intense, and almost immediately the SEC zeroed in on the trading in TGS
securities.40 The SEC brought suit against the usual defendants—TGS’s
president, general counsel, and two directors.41 But the SEC also went
after the lower-level employees who traded as well—the geologists, the
scientists, and others who bought up TGS stock.42 The SEC charged these
defendants with violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the 1934 Act) and Rule 10b-5.43 § 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlaw-
ful for anyone to engage in any manipulative or deceptive conduct or
otherwise employ any “contrivance in contravention” of the rules the
SEC prescribes “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors” while trading securities.44 Rule 10b-5 makes
it unlawful for anyone to lie, speak half-truths, mislead, defraud, or
deceive while trading in securities.45
Finding equitable principles underlying the federal securities laws, the
SEC contended that insider trading was a “constructive fraud” in viola-
tion of Rule 10b-5. The SEC contended that had disclosure been made to
the public, other market traders would not have traded, or would have
done so at a different price. This framing allowed the SEC to satisfy the
statutory prerequisite for Rule 10b-5 liability. But the underpinnings of
this theory were soft, and without any inducement of shareholder trading,
it was unclear how insider trading could be not just unfair, but actually
fraudulent.46
When the SEC brought its case, the agency was headed by William L.
Cary, who had authored Cady, Roberts a few years prior.47 That decision
set forth his view that insider trading—no matter the perpetrator48—is
40. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 833.
41. Id. at 839.
42. See id.
43. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
46. Transforming insider trading into some sort of fraud or deception such that it
would fit neatly within § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 required jumping through a series of syllo-
gisms that legal scholars have found less than satisfactory. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, United
States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading,
78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 22–30 (1998); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Propo-
sal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 189–93 (1991); Donald C.
Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1982).
47. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668 (Nov. 8, 1961),
1961 WL 60638, at *1–3. That decision is widely regarded as one of the most important
administrative opinions ever issued by the SEC. See, e.g., Walter Werner, Bill Cary and the
SEC, 83 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 767, 767 (1983). In Cady, Roberts, a broker sold shares in a
company following a phone call from a director of that company in which the director told
the broker that the company was going to cut its dividend. Cady, Roberts, 1961 WL 60638,
at *2. The SEC took the position that the broker was obligated to abstain from trading
until the information became public. See id. at *3.
48. “[A]ny sales by the insider must await disclosure of the information.” Cady, Rob-
erts, 1961 WL 60638, at *5. See also Joel Seligman, Memories of Bill Cary, 2013 COLUM.
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inherently unfair to other market participants, and that existing laws did
not adequately reach or remedy this unfairness.49 Cady, Roberts acknowl-
edged the “special obligation[s]. . . required of corporate insiders—of-
ficers, directors, and controlling stockholders”—that appeared to limit
the reach of the securities laws, but countered that the securities laws’
anti-fraud provisions are also phrased in terms of “any person.”50 The
SEC made it known that it was concerned not only with trading by those
whose relationship gave them “access, directly or indirectly, to informa-
tion intended to be available only for a corporate purpose” but also with
“the plight of the buying public—wholly unprotected from the misuse of
special information.”51 Nothing in the securities laws, nor Rule 10b-5, ac-
cording to Cady, Roberts, would require “artificial walls of responsibility”
for proper use of inside information.52
Cady, Roberts was, and largely is, in line with common perception, be-
cause the public generally perceives that insider trading is just plain un-
fair.53 The public views insider trading as “unfair,” but not necessarily evil
or immoral in itself.54 Rather, the public’s irritation with insider trading
appears less to do with the insider than with the inability of persons to
trade under similar circumstances themselves.55 Professor Stephen Bain-
bridge captures this point very well: “Most people want insider trading to
remain illegal, but most people . . . are willing to participate if given the
chance to do so on the basis of accurate information.”56 In other words,
the unfairness underlying insider trading is its inequity. Insider trading
prohibitions help to create the perception that all investors who trade on
BUS. L. REV. 318, 321 (2013) (stating that the SEC under Commissioner Cary “kept as a
mission the reduction of opportunities for . . . corporate insiders to take advantage of their
positions, as well as a general commitment to raising fiduciary standards”).
49. See Cady, Roberts, 1961 WL 60638, at *1, *3 (acknowledging the decision as one
“of signal importance,” describing the “purchase and sale of securities” as a “field in spe-
cial need of regulation for the protection of investors,” and stating that the securities laws
“generated a wholly new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation law”). See also
Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading,
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 430 (2013) (“By all accounts, William Cary, then Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, . . . wanted to promote a wide scope to Rule
10b-5, which would include fiduciary breaches (i.e., constructive fraud), as well as classical
common law deceit, and thus help build a federal body of corporate law that would supple-
ment, if not supplant, the meager efforts of state courts and legislatures.”); Donald C.
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regu-
lation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (1999) (describing Cady, Roberts as a “new corpora-
tion law” case); Seligman, supra note 49, at 326–27 (describing how SEC Commissioner
Cary’s Cady, Roberts decision “broadly expanded” Rule 10b-5 and restrictions on insider
trading).
50. Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *4.
51. Id. at *4, *5.
52. See id. at *5.
53. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties Into the
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1241 & n.219 (1995);
Langevoort, supra note 50, at 1326.
54. See Bainbridge, supra note 53, at 1242.
55. See id.
56. Id.
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the open market do so on a relatively equal plane.57
When someone in a position of trust or power trades on inside informa-
tion, that sort of insider trading is viewed as not only unfair, but also an
abuse of that person’s position. Professor Donald Langevoort hints at this
dynamic, acknowledging that tales of insider trading involving “the rich
and famous like Ivan Boesky and Michael Milliken . . . tap into images of
power, greed, and hubris,” yet “when [the tales] deal with the smaller
traders, they conjure up images of Everyman with luck and far too little
self-restraint.”58 Someone already in a position of power or trust taking
advantage of inside information is not only unfair, but is an abuse of
power. For confirmation, we need look no further than the plaintiff’s bar.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers will look for evidence of insider trading by senior man-
agement when evaluating whether to invest in bringing a private securi-
ties-fraud class action. Insider trading by corporate executives can be
used to turn the jury against those defendants.59 It is even judicial doc-
trine that insider trading by senior management can give rise to an infer-
ence that management was acting with the intent to get one over on the
investing public.60
57. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning
Non-public Information, 73 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1115 (1985) (contending that “[t]he primary
policy reason for proscribing trading while in possession of material, non-public informa-
tion is to make investors confident that they can trade securities without being subject to
informational disadvantages.”). Insider trading continues to be a central feature of the
SEC’s enforcement program. See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Division of Enforce-
ment, ANNUAL REPORT: A LOOK BACK AT FISCAL YEAR 2017, 4 (2017) (stating that in-
sider trading will be one of several priorities for the SEC Enforcement Division); Thomas
C. Newkirk & Melissa A. Robertson, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff:
Insider Trading – A U.S. Perspective (Sept. 19, 1998) (“An essential part of our regulation
of the securities market is the vigorous enforcement of our laws against insider trading, an
enforcement program, the Chairman noted, that ‘resonate[s] especially profoundly’ among
American investors.”).
Whether the securities laws should address this unfairness is another matter, and on that,
there are conflicting views. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition:
A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 42–61 (1986) (summarizing the
arguments for “deregulating” insider trading, stating that insider trading would move the
price closer to its true value and is an efficient way to compensate managers; conversely,
summarizing the arguments for “regulating” insider trading and stating that insider trading
is not a cost-effective mechanism for promoting market efficiency or compensating manag-
ers, and even still, creates substantial social costs and fairness concerns); George W. Dent,
Jr., Why Legalized Insider Trading Would be A Disaster, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 247, 248
(2013) (contending that legalized insider trading would “muscle out” the investing public,
shrink stock markets, and cause managers of public companies to forsake their investors
for personal gain); Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
119, 150–91 (2002) (summarizing arguments for and against regulation of insider trading
and making a “fairness” case for the regulation of insider trading).
58. Langevoort, supra note 49, at 1329.
59. See MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 PRIVATE SE-
CURITIES-FRAUD LITIGATION § 3:2 (2018 ed.) (summarizing factors suggesting a factually
strong case for a Rule 10b-5 private plaintiff, including that the “company’s senior officers
or directors engage in suspicious selling of stock. Insider trading appeals to a jury and may
evidence fraudulent intent.”).
60. See, e.g., No. 84 Emp’r-Teamster Joint Council Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Hold-
ing Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 938–41 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district judge could
strongly infer the defendants acted with scienter by virtue of insiders selling nearly all of
their stock before the company released bad news about potential government sanctions);
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C. THE TGS DECISION
The SEC sought to use TGS as the vehicle to get judicial endorsement
for Cady, Roberts. At the district court level, however, the SEC lost.61
The district judge believed insider trading by those who abuse their posi-
tions was something worthy of insider trading laws, but the mere inequity
or unfairness of insider trading was not.62
On appeal, however, the SEC’s view found allies in an en banc panel of
Second Circuit judges.63 In TGS, the Second Circuit set out to protect
investors from insider trading and to expand the securities laws that regu-
late the practice.
First, TGS endorsed the SEC’s view that insider trading is inherently
inequitable and unfair, no matter if the trader is in the corporate suite or
otherwise, a fiduciary or not.64 “[I]nequities based upon equal access to
knowledge,” the court said, “should not be shrugged off as inevitable in
our way of life, or, in view of the congressional concern in the area, re-
main uncorrected.”65 So after TGS dismissed the idea that insider trading
was simply a perk of inside status—”a normal emolument of corporate
office”66—the court took aim at the other traders. The court was obvi-
ously troubled by trading on such inside information, with no distinction
made for who the trader was:
The insiders here were not trading on an equal footing with the
outside investors. They alone were in a position to evaluate the
probability and magnitude of what seemed from the outset to be a
major ore strike; they alone could invest safely, secure in the expec-
tation that the price of TGS stock would rise substantially in the
event such a major strike should materialize, but would decline little,
if at all, in the event of failure, for the public, ignorant at the outset
Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 656 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating
that “trading at a particular time is circumstantial evidence that the insider knew the best
time to trade because he or she had inside information not shared by the public” and “kept
the information from the public in order to trade on the unfair advantage”); In re Apple
Computer Secs. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Insider trading in suspicious
amounts or at suspicious times is probative of bad faith and scienter.”).
61. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
62. Id. at 284 (quoting Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.3d 809, 823 (2d Cir.
1944) (Hand, J., dissenting)) (“It may be that the ‘fairness’ overtones of Cady, Roberts
indicate a trend toward the elimination of all insider purchasing. But even were the Court
to accept the proposition that all insider trading is unfair, a proposition of doubtful validity
at best, it would be deterred by the admonition of Judge Learned Hand that it is not ‘desir-
able for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine
which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant.’”).
63. In fact, as Professor Langevoort recounts, by the time TGS came around, the Sec-
ond Circuit had already set the SEC’s position in motion, holding, just a few years earlier
“that insiders had [an] obligation of affirmative disclosure when engaged in face-to-face
securities transactions. Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A
Tale of Two Duties 5 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Georgetown University
Law Center).
64. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
65. Id.
66. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668 (Nov. 8, 1961),
1961 WL 60638, at *4 n.15.
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of the favorable probabilities would likewise be unaware of the un-
productive exploration and additional exploration costs would not
significantly affect TGS market prices.67
Second, to ensnare insider trading under the net of liability laid by
Rule 10b-5, TGS, like Cady, Roberts, deemed insider trading a construc-
tive fraud.68 In so doing, TGS deliberately expanded what it perceived as
“the limited protection afforded outside investors” under existing law,
and then used this expansion to level the playing field for investors.69
“The core of Rule 10b-5,” the court said, “is the implementation of the
Congressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the
rewards of participation in securities transactions.”70 In particular, to ef-
fectuate Congress’s purpose of protecting the investing public and insur-
ing the “maintenance of fair and honest markets,” TGS modified the
common law standard of deceptive conduct so that negligent insider con-
duct would also be unlawful.71 And TGS found that the securities laws
contained obligations that exceeded common law duties and prohibitions.
At common law, the failure to disclose material, non-public information
generally does not gives rise to an action for fraud in the absence of a
duty to disclose. But that common law duty to disclose usually arises only
when there is a pre-existing fiduciary duty among the parties. TGS, how-
ever, concluded that § 10b and Rule 10b-5 were designed to expand com-
mon law protections.72
Ultimately, TGS declared that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either dis-
close it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it
in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do
so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.73
TGS’s rule “was probably the broadest possible formulation of a prohibi-
tion against insider trading.”74
At the time, it made sense for the Second Circuit to take up the mantle
on expanding the securities laws; in the 1960s, the Second Circuit was the
steward of the securities laws.75 The Supreme Court was not as involved
67. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852.
68. See id. at 855.
69. Id. at 851.
70. Id. at 851–52 (emphasis added). See also id. at 852 (“It was the intent of Congress
that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical market risks—which
market risks include, of course, the risk that one’s evaluative capacity or one’s capital avail-
able to put at risk may exceed another’s capacity or capital.”).
71. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 855.
72. Id. at 851. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983)
(stating that Congress enacted the federal securities laws “to rectify perceived deficiencies
in the available common law protections”).
73. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
74. Charles W. Murdock, Insider Trading, in 8 ILL. PRAC. SERIES, BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS § 15:11 (2d ed. 2017).
75. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (deeming the Second Circuit the “Mother Court” for securities juris-
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in developing securities jurisprudence as it is today.76 But the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision in TGS was not just typical tending to the field; the deci-
sion was a fundamental pronouncement on how persons could trade in
the market. As Professor Donald Langevoort writes, at the time of the
decision, the judiciary generally was at its zenith in “pursuing a broad,
expansive common law style of securities law jurisprudence” such that
“courts were entitled and expected to add onto statutory obligations
based on purely purposive reasoning.”77 Many scholars of the day viewed
TGS as a remarkable expansion of (and for some, an alarming departure
from) established SEC and judicial precedent at the time.78 Under TGS,
fiduciaries were not the only ones liable for insider trading.79 The insider
trading prohibition may have operated differently for non-fiduciary insid-
ers, but it operated nonetheless. As summarized by Professor Stephen
Bainbridge:
[U]nder TGS and its progeny, virtually anyone that possessed mate-
rial, non-public information was required either to disclose it to the
investment public before trading or abstain from trading in the af-
fected company’s securities. If the would-be trader’s fiduciary duties
precluded him from disclosing the information prior to trading, ab-
stention was the only option.80
In TGS, this meant that not just the company’s Vice President, President,
and directors were on the hook for their trading, but even the geologist
was liable as well.81
prudence); Karen Patton Seymour, Securities and Financial Regulation in the Second
Circuit, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 225 (2016) (“From 1961 to 1978, the Second Circuit
produced nearly five times as many securities law opinions as the average federal appellate
court; the Second Circuit was responsible for one-third of all securities opinions issued by
appellate courts.”).
76. See A.C. Pritchard, Securities Laws in the Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference,
37 J. CORP. L. 105, 106–07 (2011).
77. Langevoort, supra note 63, at 4.
78. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 37–39; Platt W. Davis III, Rule 10b-5 Is
Violated Whenever an Insider Purchases Stock Without Disclosing Information That Would
Affect the Judgment of a Reasonable Investor, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 509, 514 (1969) (stating
TGS “may have inhibited severely the legitimate activities of imaginative and aggressive
insiders.”); Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et. al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 816 (1973) (stating that TGS “embodies a
dramatic stretching of present doctrine” beyond just fiduciaries); Roberta S. Karmel, Out-
sider Trading on Confidential Information – A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 83, 89 (1998) (stating that the “parity of information” theory upon which Cady, Rob-
erts and TGS rest “ha[d] not been accepted by the Supreme Court or the SEC itself”);
Roberta S. Karmel, The Law on Insider Trading Lacks Needed Definition, 68 SMU L. REV.
757, 760 (2015) (noting that parity of information “was not fully accepted by all SEC Com-
missioners and was later rejected by the Supreme Court”); Langevoort, supra note 63, at 2
(describing Texas Gulf Sulphur as a “blockbuster ruling[ ] at the time”).
79. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
80. Bainbridge, supra note 53, at 1194 (footnotes omitted).
81. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852.
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III. LIMITING INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS UNDER
CHIARELLA
In Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the insider
trading prohibitions of the securities laws did not apply to everyone who
has material, non-public information, but only to traditional common law
fiduciaries.82 The Court seemed to reject TGS’s result and reasoning, con-
cluding that only traditional common law fiduciaries—i.e., those in posi-
tions of trust and confidence vis-a`-vis the information—would be
prohibited from trading on material, non-public information.83 In the
Chiarella Court’s view, the securities laws do not espouse a principle of
fairness and informational parity, as set forth in TGS.84 Rather, one’s
trading obligations run with status, not mere possession of material, non-
public information.85 Chiarella seems to put to rest TGS’s equality-of-
information principle:
We cannot affirm petitioner’s conviction without recognizing a gen-
eral duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo ac-
tions based on material, non-public information. Formulation of such
a broad duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine
that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties . . .
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congres-
sional intent.86
But then, using the “constructive fraud” concept set out by TGS, the
Court said that under the common law silence can indeed constitute
fraud, but only in the face an affirmative common law duty to disclose.
Further, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 themselves do not create disclosure obli-
gations not already present at common law. For those with material, non-
public information, unless they have a special fiduciary status or some
other common law obligation to disclose, their trading without disclosure
is not fraudulent—constructive or otherwise—and thus beyond the reach
of Rule 10b-5.87
82. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
83. See id. On this issue, Professor Langevoort makes the case that even if TGS
planted “some seeds of egalitarianism,” even before Chiarella, “they bore surprisingly little
fruit.” Langevoort, supra note 63, at 10, 15 (surveying post-TGS decisions and enforcement
actions and concluding that duty was “clearly becoming status-based, not possession-
based” and noting that “the egalitarianism expressed in TGS was long gone by the time
Justice Powell wrote the Court’s opinion in Chiarella.”).
84. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (“[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness consti-
tutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b).”).
85. See id. at 235.
86. Id. at 233.
87. For the trader in Chiarella, this was dispositive. See id. at 224–25. While working
for a financial printer, Mr. Chiarella gleaned from data contained in tender-offer materials
the identities of five target companies. Id. Over the course of 15 months, he bought stock
in targets before five different tender offer materials had been published, and sold the
stock after the announcements of the offers drove the price up. Id. He was not a corporate
insider. He wasn’t wealthy or well connected. He set typeface and page layouts for various
printer jobs. He was charged criminally, and the Second Circuit upheld his jury conviction,
reasoning that Rule 10b-5 renders unlawful the mere receipt of material, non-public infor-
mation where the recipient fails to disclose the information. Id. at 231. But the Supreme
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF TGS’S EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
AFTER CHIARELLA
While TGS did not immediately erect principles of equitable trading,
its lasting contribution is that it gave life to the idea that insider trading is
unfair—a “constructive fraud.”88 Since Chiarella, the SEC and the federal
courts have stretched the concept of “insider” and “fiduciary,” and have
attempted other expansions that harken back to the equitable trading
principles articulated in TGS. As Professor Donna M. Nagy writes, in-
sider trading law has returned “almost full circle to the years preceding
Chiarella.”89
In Dirks v. SEC,90 the Court appears to reaffirm Chiarella’s premise
that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not contain any requirement of fairness,
parity, or equal access to material information. Dirks also reiterated that
Court reversed. Id. at 235. No common law duty arose from his relationship with the sellers
of the securities because he “had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he
was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through
impersonal market transactions.” Id. at 232–33.
88. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV.
928, 945 (2014):
The closer one looks at insider trading law, the messier it appears. In what
seemed like a reasonable strategy, the Supreme Court initially adopted an
insider trading as common law fraud approach. But as the Court sought to
punish different sorts of trading misbehavior, it initiated doctrinal extensions
and mutations, stretched even further in unexpected ways by lower courts,
which now seem to threaten insider trading law’s basic stability and internal
coherence. Indeed, we now have reason to question the centrality of breach
of fiduciary duty and even fraud.
Langevoort, supra note 63, at 15–16 (stating that “the spirit of TGS did return to push
against the newly narrowed insider trading prohibition, and the nearly four decades since
Chiarella have shown much more expansion than limitation in insider trading doctrine”).
After Chiarella, the SEC itself sought to revive the rule of law on insider trading as set
out in TGS and move the prohibition on insider trading beyond mere fiduciaries. See, e.g.,
Marc I. Steinberg, From the Editor-In-Chief, 45 SEC. REG. L. J. 1 (Spring 2017) (Professor
Steinberg, who was an SEC attorney post-Chiarella, stating “the SEC . . . was displeased
with the Court’s narrow interpretation of the insider trading prohibition” in Chiarella and
thus, “shortly after . . . opted to adopt an expansive insider trading prohibition within the
confines of tender offer regulation”). The SEC adopted § 14(e), which adopted an expan-
sive insider trading prohibition within the confines of tender-offer regulation. Rule 14e-3
prohibits any person from trading or tipping on material, non-public information if that
person knows or has reason to know that such information was received directly or indi-
rectly from an inside source. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.14e-3 (2017). There is no logical justifica-
tion for treating insider trading in the context of a tender offer different than insider
trading otherwise. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 88 (“[D]isparate treatment in the tender
offer setting as compared to other contexts signifies that a subject person’s legality of trad-
ing and tipping is dependent on the form of the transaction. Hence, if the subject transac-
tion is a merger, only § 10(b) applies with respect to insider trades. Yet if the transaction is
structured as a tender offer, then Rule 14e-3 becomes applicable as well, thereby casting a
wide liability net. It makes no sense that one can legally buy a luxurious penthouse or go to
the slammer based on engaging in identical conduct—with the only differentiation that, for
unrelated reasons, the ‘deal’ was structured as a merger or tender offer.”). And yet, in the
tender-offer context, TGS lives; outside it, TGS just haunts.
89. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles,
94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2009).
90. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Rule 10b-5 would not reach insider trading absent some fiduciary or com-
mon law requirement to disclose: “there can be no duty to disclose where
the person who has traded on inside information ‘was not [the corpora-
tion’s] agent, . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the
sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and confidence.’”91
As Dirks built on Chiarella, however, it also expanded its framework
for liability in two ways, albeit still hewing closely to the idea that some
fiduciary or common law relationship must exist before insider trading
would be impermissible under the securities laws.92 First, Dirks set up a
framework by which persons could become constructive fiduciaries.93
Under Dirks, someone is a constructive fiduciary when: (1) that person
enters into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the busi-
ness of the enterprise, (2) is given access to information solely for corpo-
rate purposes, and (3) the corporation expects that the information will
remain confidential.94 Second, Dirks pushed the bounds of liability for
insider trading further still to one who lacks a fiduciary duty to sharehold-
ers altogether.95 According to Dirks, one could violate Rule 10b-5 if that
person tips off another trader to material, non-public information that he
came by “improperly.”96 Information is leaked “improperly” if the in-
sider has breached a fiduciary duty to the corporate shareholders by dis-
closing the information to the tippee.97 The tippee assumes or inherits the
insider’s fiduciary duty when that tippee knows or should know that there
has been a breach.98
Still, there must be a link between the tippee’s breach and the tippee’s
knowing or reckless use of the tipped information. That link is supplied
when the insider benefits personally from the disclosure.99 Dirks estab-
lished the common law fiduciary duty and personal-benefit framework
“in a case brought under the classical theory of insider-trading liability,
which applies ‘when a corporate insider’ or his tippee ‘trades in the secur-
ities of [the tipper’s] corporation on the basis of material, non-public in-
formation.’”100 “In such a case, the defendant breaches a duty to, and
takes advantage of, the shareholders of his corporation.”101
In Salman, the Supreme Court settled that a jury can infer a personal
benefit where the tipper receives something of value in exchange for the
tip or makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
91. Id. at 654.
92. See id. at 654–55 (stating that a “duty must arise from a specific relationship be-
tween two parties”).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 655 n.14.
95. See id. at 660.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 659.
98. Id. See also Kim, supra note 88, at 941 (describing how Dirks mutates the features
of and ultimately departs from the fiduciary duty requirement to “reach the result that it
wanted, namely, to proscribe tipping.”).
99. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
100. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.2 (2016).
101. Id.
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friend.102 There, the Court reaffirmed that “§ 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule
10b-5 prohibit undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by in-
dividuals who are under a duty of trust and confidence that prohibits
them from secretly using such information for their personal
advantage.”103
In Salman, an investment banker employed at Citigroup repeatedly
gave tips to his brother on pending mergers and acquisitions, knowing
that the brother was using the information to trade.104 That brother also
passed those tips to a relative, Bassam Salman, who was later convicted
of securities fraud.105 Providing the tip to a relative was by itself sufficient
to confer a personal benefit. As the Court reasoned: “Making a gift of
inside information to a relative . . . is little different from trading on the
information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the trading rel-
ative. The tipper benefits either way.”106 According to the Court,
“when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trad-
ing relative or friend . . . [t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the
insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.” In
these situations, the tipper personally benefits because giving a gift
of trading information to a trading relative is the same thing as trad-
ing by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds. Here, by disclos-
ing confidential information as a gift to his brother with the
expectation that he would trade on it, Maher breached his duty of
trust and confidence to Citigroup and its clients—a duty acquired
and breached by Salman when he traded on the information with full
knowledge that it had been improperly disclosed.107
The Supreme Court further expanded insider trading beyond corporate
insiders to not just fiduciaries, actual or constructive, but to those who
“misappropriate” non-public information.108 Under this theory, adopted
in United States v. O’Hagan, one who misappropriates material, non-pub-
lic information is in breach of a duty owed, and when he trades on the
basis of that information, he is then breaking the prohibition on insider
trading and committing a constructive fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5.109
In that case, James O’Hagan, a former law firm partner, learned that a
firm client was planning a hostile takeover of another company.110 Need-
ing money to cover stealing from client trust accounts, he bought shares
102. See id. at 428.
103. Id. at 423.
104. See id. at 423–25.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 428.
107. Id. at 422 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664) (citation omitted).
108. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997). Federal appellate courts began
embracing the misappropriation theory before the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Hagan.
See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); SEC v.
Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408–09 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443–44 (9th Cir.
1990).
109. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
110. Id. at 647–48.
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and call options for the target company’s stock.111 O’Hagan’s investments
reaped about $4.3 million when he sold.112 The SEC charged him, but the
Eighth Circuit overturned.113 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
O’Hagan committed fraud in connection with a securities transaction be-
cause, by misappropriating confidential information, he breached a duty
he owed to the source of the information.114
Notably, the Court called back to the days of TGS when the prohibi-
tion on insider trading would ensure a level playing field.115 The Court
said that
[a]lthough informational disparity is inevitable in the securities mar-
kets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a mar-
ket where trading based on misappropriated non-public information
is unchecked by law. An investor’s informational disadvantage vis-a´-
vis a misappropriator with material, non-public information stems
from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be over-
come with research or skill.116
With O’Hagan, one can see how elastic the “fiduciary” requirement
becomes. Under the “classical” theory endorsed in Chiarella (and
stretched in Dirks), the trader has some relationship to the company sell-
ing the securities. But under a misappropriation theory, the trader need
not have had any relationship to the company selling securities; rather,
the trader uses material, non-public information that was entrusted to
him while he had a duty of trust or confidence to the source of the
information.117
Next, under the guise of the misappropriation theory, the SEC and the
appellate courts expanded the misrepresentation theory even in the com-
plete absence of any fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship. Some cases
are examples of ignoring precedent outright. Professor Nagy examined
insider trading decisions after O’Hagan and found a growing number of
courts and SEC enforcement actions that simply disregarded the tradi-
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 648–49.
114. Id. at 652. The doctrinal underpinnings of O’Hagan are hard to reconcile, sug-
gesting the Court was dabbling in legal fiction to get the result it wanted. “The most per-
plexing aspect of the misappropriation theory is the way it transforms a breach of duty to
an employer or client under state law into a fraud under the federal securities laws.”
Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information, supra note 78, at 109. See also Kim,
supra note 88, at 943 (“[C]onsider what the Court did in O’Hagan. By adopting the misap-
propriation theory, the Court switched its focus from what the defendant did to the
counterparties of the trade to what the defendant, as an agent, did to his principal. Accord-
ingly, the Court relied not on the common law of fraud and deceit that undergirded
Chiarella, but the common law of agency, citing extensively to the Restatement (Second)
of Agency relating to an ‘agent’s disclosure obligation regarding use of confidential
information.’”).
115. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658–59.
116. Id.
117. The SEC would later decree that, in its view, for purposes of the misappropriation
theory, a duty of trust or confidence would exist whenever a person agreed to maintain
information in confidence. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2017).
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tional common law fiduciary status dictate when it foreclosed liability.118
But there have been doctrinal adjustments by the lower courts that
have reinforced the equitable trading principles of TGS and treated in-
sider trading as a constructive fraud. SEC v. Dorozhko is a prominent
example.119 In Dorozhko, the SEC pursued a trader who had no relation-
ship whatsoever to the source of information.120 The trader was not em-
ployed by the issuer, did not contract with the issuer, was not an agent for
the issuer, and, as far as we know, had no contact or communications with
the issuer or anyone affiliated with the issuer.121 Rather, Oleksandr
Dorozhko hacked into Thomson Financial’s servers and accessed confi-
dential quarterly earnings reports on a company called IMS Health. With
that information, he bought about $40,000 of IMS put options.122 At the
close of trading, IMS announced its earnings were 28% below what Wall
Street expected. When Dorozhko sold his options the next day, he real-
ized a profit of nearly $287,000.123
There’s no question Dorozhko was engaged in wrongdoing—he hacked
into Thomson Financial’s systems and stole information.124 But was he
engaged in insider trading? He was not an insider and he owed no fiduci-
ary duty to IMS or Thomson Financial.125 But the Second Circuit held
Dorozhko could be liable anyway; remarkably, the Second Circuit said
that the prohibition on insider trading wasn’t necessarily limited to fiduci-
aries.126 The Second Circuit stated that when insider trading liability is
premised on an affirmative misrepresentation, the person trading does
not have to be an actual or even constructive fiduciary, a tipper or tippee,
or stand in a position of trust to the source of information.127
Even under the “misappropriation” theory, this outcome was ex-
tremely hard to square with existing boundaries on insider trading.128 To
bring Dorozhko’s case within the ambit of the misappropriation theory,
118. Nagy, supra note 89, at 1340–48.
119. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
120. Id. at 43–45.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 44. This amount of trading was unlikely to go unnoticed. In fact, Dorozhko’s
put purchases accounted for about 90% of all put purchases for IMS stock for an entire six-
week period. Dorozhko’s brokerage service noticed the activity and referred it to the SEC.
See id.
123. Id.
124. See id. The district court rightly noted that Dorozhko could have been charged
with violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), the mail fraud
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 et seq., and the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the U.S.
Attorney could have seized Dorozhko’s trading proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 981(b). See
SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
125. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 44.
126. Id. at 48–49 (“In our view, none of the Supreme Court opinions . . . establishes a
fiduciary-duty requirement as an element of every violation of § 10(b),” and “Chiarella,
O’Hagan, and Zandford all stand for the proposition that nondisclosure in breach of a
fiduciary duty satisfies § 10(b)’s requirement . . . of a deceptive device or contrivance”)
(citations omitted).
127. Id. at 49.
128. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, Insider Trading Flaw: Toward a Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory and Beyond, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 76 (2016) (describing Dorozhko as “analytical
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the Second Circuit had to say that stealing was the same as lying:
“[D]efendant affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to gain access
to material, non-public information, which he then used to trade.”129 No
one whose home was robbed would think they had just been duped or
lied to; stealing isn’t the same as deceiving. “At most, the hacker ‘lies’ to
a computer network, not a person.”130 Yet this was enough for the Sec-
ond Circuit: “In our view, misrepresenting one’s identity in order to gain
access to information that is otherwise off limits, and then stealing that
information is plainly ‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of the
word.”131 But, as pointed out by the district court in Dorozhko, serious
scholars of insider trading jurisprudence understood that insider trading
laws would not ensnare someone who trades off information stolen from
illegal hacking, even if there may be good policy reasons for doing so.132
For the entire existence of the securities laws up to Dorozhko, no federal
court had ever held that those who steal material, non-public information
and then traded on it violated the securities laws’ prohibition on insider
trading.133 How insider trading after stealing is an “affirmative misrepre-
sentation” under Rule 10b-5 (such that no fiduciary status is needed), but
insider trading after some other conduct is not (such that fiduciary status
is needed), is unclear. And Dorozhko is just one example. Professor Nagy
points to other similar computer-hack cases brought by the SEC (which
defendants later settled) and other instances where federal courts
stretched (if not broke) the rules to permit prosecution of persons whose
trading was within legal bounds but still offensive to our notions of
bootstrapping”); Michael D. Wheatley, Apologia For the Second Circuit’s Opinion in SEC
v. Dorozhko, 7 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 37, 42 (2010).
129. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49.
130. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Second Circuit’s Egregious Decision in SEC v.




131. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51. The Second Circuit tried to finesse this further, saying
that the outcome, in some cases, may hinge on the type of hack. See id. For instance, the
Second Circuit said, if the hacker merely exploited “a weakness in an electronic code to
gain unauthorized access,” that might be “mere theft.” Id.
132. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 341–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Kathleen
Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 221 (2005–2006); Donna
M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-
O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 1223, 1249–57 (1998); Robert A. Prentice, The
Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 263, 296–307 (1999)). Even the government, when it argued O’Hagan, acknowl-
edged that the misappropriation theory would not extend to securities trading by a stran-
ger who stole confidential information. See Nagy, supra note 89, at 1334.
133. See Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (“Although a coherent system of insider
trading regulation could cover ‘stealing and trading’ or ‘hacking and trading,’ as far as this
Court is aware, no federal court has ever held that those who steal material, non-public
information and then trade on it violate § 10(b). Even by itself, this lack of any case law
supporting the SEC position is noteworthy. The Exchange Act was enacted over seventy-
four years ago, and parallel situations have no doubt arisen in that time span. While the
SEC attempts to paint hacking as a new challenge for the securities laws, traditional theft
(e.g. breaking into an investment bank and stealing documents) is hardly a new phenome-
non, and involves similar elements for purposes of our analysis here.”).
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fairness.134
In the wake of Dirks, O’Hagan, and Salman, liability for insider trading
extends to persons who trade on material, non-public information in
breach of a duty to disclose running to the trading counterpart or to the
source of the information; to tippers who disclose material, non-public
information to another trader in breach of their fiduciary duty not to do
so; and to tippees who trade on material, non-public information knowing
that they received the information from a tipper who breached a duty to
disclose in return for a personal, familial or financial benefit. Liability
now extends well beyond common law fraud to encompass anyone who
inequitably benefits from professional or familial relationships. The prin-
ciples of equitable access to information which form the bedrock of TGS
have not only survived, they provide the foundation for contemporary
insider trading law.
V. FROM TGS TO LAUDATO SI’
A. TGS’S EQUITABLE TRADING PRINCIPLE ARE CONSISTENT WITH
THE TEACHINGS OF POPE FRANCIS
In Laudato Si’ and other teachings, Pope Francis decries our inequita-
ble economic system, which has produced a “throwaway culture”135 that
has “rupture[d] . . . the bonds of integration and social cohesion.”136 The
Pope recognizes “how environmental deterioration and human and ethi-
cal degradation are closely linked.”137 An economic system that idolizes
the maximization of profits, including profits reaped unjustly from the
misappropriation of material, non-public information, diminishes human
dignity and degrades the natural environment. The Pope declares that
“we should be particularly indignant at the enormous inequalities in our
midst, whereby we continue to tolerate some considering themselves
more worthy than others.”138
Like the court in TGS, the Pope would seek a legal structure that en-
courages equitable trading rather than insider trading. TGS tried to erect
just such a structure, and as demonstrated in this article, was ultimately
fairly successful in doing so. TGS discourages unequal access to informa-
tion. As the Pope teaches, and as TGS placed into law, information is a
valuable resource that should be shared equitably.139 Insider trading in-
volves the inequitable misappropriation of informational resources for
personal gain. It is unjust because it diminishes our common wealth and
devalues our shared humanity.
134. Nagy, supra note 89, at 1340–48.
135. Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter, Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home,
THE HOLY SEE para. 43 (2015) [hereinafter Laudato Si’], http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/
francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NPY-GY5P].
136. Id. para. 46.
137. Id. para. 56
138. Id. para. 90.
139. See id. para. 104.
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The principle of equity that understands that information is a valuable
resource to be shared has its roots in the concept of the universal destina-
tion of material goods. As the Pope writes, “[t]he principle of the subordi-
nation of private property to the universal destination of goods, and thus
the right of everyone to their use, is a golden rule of social con-
duct. . . .”140 This principle does not devalue private property. To the
contrary, the appropriation of natural resources by individuals is an in-
strument of the universal destination of goods. By appropriating only
those material goods that are needed for human flourishing, individuals
can freely exchange material goods to others who need them most. Equi-
table appropriation of resources increases the common wealth; by con-
trast, the misappropriation of resources like information degrades
resources and decreases individual and collective well-being.
B. TGS’S EQUAL ACCESS PRINCIPLE ARE CONSISTENT WITH A
ROBUST CAPITALIST ECONOMY
In Laudato Si’, the Pope declares that “[t]he principle of the maximiza-
tion of profits, frequently isolated from other considerations, reflects a
misunderstanding of the very concept of the economy.”141 A wealth of
empirical evidence supports the Pope’s declaration. In Lawless Capital-
ism: The Subprime Crisis and the Case for an Economic Rule of Law,142
for example, Steven Ramirez documents the inefficiencies of unre-
strained capitalism and demonstrates how “excessive economic inequality
breeds too much elite privilege,” which in turn leads to the “irrational
underdevelopment of human potential.”143 In fact, countries with rela-
tively low economic inequality experience sustained economic growth.144
Moreover, sustained economic growth is not adversely impacted by the
redistribution of resources to achieve economic equality.145 Professor Ra-
mirez argues that the founders of our capitalist economic system, includ-
ing Adam Smith, actually espoused a much more nuanced understanding
of human and market behavior—one that establishes the value of mutu-
ally beneficial transactions, rather than the advantage of one side at the
expense of the other.146
In language entirely consistent with the Pope’s understanding that mu-
tually beneficial transactions maximize our human potential and common
wealth, Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, declared:
140. Id. para. 93.
141. Id. para. 195.
142.  STEVEN RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE
FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW (2012).
143. Id. at 132.
144. See Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, Inequality and Unsustainable Growth:
Two Sides of the Same Coin?, INT’L MONETARY FUND 9 (Apr. 8, 2011), https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1108.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW76-EFDW].
145. See Jonathan D. Ostry et al., Redistribution, Inequality and Growth, INT’L MONE-
TARY FUND 24 (Apr. 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1402.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HX6N-67SS].
146. See RAMIREZ, supra note 142, at 17.
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We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never
form any judgment concerning them, unless we remove ourselves, as
it were, from our own natural station, and endeavor to view them as
at a certain distance from us. But we can do this in no other way than
by endeavoring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as
other people are likely to view them.147
Thus, the foundations of capitalism do not justify the unfettered acquisi-
tion and consumption of resources, including informational resources.
Rather, as Professor Ramirez demonstrates, it is the Pope’s message and
the equitable trading principles announced in TGS that are “fully consis-
tent with the most robust systems of capitalism.”148
In fact, there is an emerging body of evidence that indicates that rigor-
ous prohibitions on insider trading lead to greater investment and innova-
tion. In Insider Trading and Innovation, the authors demonstrate “that
enforcing insider trading laws spurs investment and innovation—as mea-
sured by patent intensity, scope, impact, generality, and originality.”149
Laws that permit insider trading, by contrast, slow innovation and invest-
ment by impeding the reliable valuation of innovative activities.150 Equity
issuances also rise much more in industries after a country starts enforc-
ing its rigorous insider trading laws.151
The Supreme Court recognized the power of this evidence in O’Hagan.
In language that fully supports the guiding principles of TGS and
Laudato Si’, the Court there decried an “investor’s informational disad-
vantage” as the product of a constructive fraud, and recognized that
“[a]lthough informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets,
investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where
trading based on misappropriated non-public information is unchecked
by law.”152 As the Supreme Court affirms, empirical evidence indicates
that the principles of equitable trading espoused in TGS and Laudato Si’
are more conducive to economic growth than are legal structures that
enable insiders to unfairly profit by misappropriating material, non-public
information.
C. THE ANOMALY IN TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
A closer look at the equitable trading principles espoused in both TGS
and the Pope’s teachings reveals an anomaly however. The court in TGS
erected the equal access principle for information, but disregarded that
same principle for natural resources. TGS purchased land near Timmins,
147. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 161 (1759).
148. Steven A. Ramirez, Social Justice and Capitalism: An Assessment of the Teachings
of Pope Francis from a Law and Macroeconomics Perspective, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1229, 1234 (2017).
149. See Ross Levine et al., Insider Trading and Innovation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 21634, 2015).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).
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Ontario, based on its non-public assessment of the potential value of the
land and as a drilling site.153 The Kidd 55 site was only one of several
thousand anomalies (areas where there is unusual variation in the electri-
cal conductivity of rocks) that TGS detected in its aerial exploration of
the Canadian Shield.154 Several hundred of these were considered worthy
of further study and options on the land around them were acquired.155
In fact, the district court in TGS found that “TGS had previously drilled
65 equally promising anomalies, but most of them had revealed either
barren pyrite or graphite, while a few had shown marginal mineral depos-
its in insufficient quantities to be commercially mined.”156
The TGS court implicitly defends the defendants’ intentional and sus-
tained misappropriation of these natural resources, even as it condemns
those defendants for their misappropriation of information. In Mining in
Ontario—A Deeper Look, Rike Burkhardt, Peter Rosenbluth, and Julee
Boan show that “[w]hile the life of a mine can last a few years, the foot-
print it leaves in the land can be permanent.”157 Although TGS unques-
tionably brought employment and economic opportunity to Timmons, its
unrestrained mine exploration and development has had devastating
long-term effects on the environment, including acid mine drainage, fuel
and hydronic fluid contamination, trenching erosion, and water and soil
poisoning.158
The actual development of the mine exacerbates these hazards and also
brings contamination of surface and groundwater, increased erosion of
lakes and streams, acid generation from waste rock, wildlife and fishery
loss, waste rock piles, and tailings disposal areas.159 The crushed rock and
chemicals left after the extraction process are called tailings. The tailings
are the nonvaluable portions that remain after the valuable portions of
minerals are taken out. As a rule, at least 95% percent of the material
extracted from the process becomes tailings waste.160
The Timmons Kidd Site, for example, stores more than 100 million tons
of base metal sulphide tailings in a pile that is 1.2 kilometers wide and 25
meters high.161 The waste site is surrounded by tributaries of the Porcu-
pine River. The extraction process required the use of poisonous chemi-
cals such as sodium cyanide and sulphuric acid.162 The potential that
these tailings sites will leak into the water supply causing serious environ-
mental hazards is significant. These tailings sites have in fact failed, spill-
153. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1968).
154. Id. at 843.
155. Id. at 843–44.
156. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
157. Rike Burkhardt et al., Mining in Ontario—A Deeper Look, ONTARIO NATURE,
http://ontarionature.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/mining-in-ontario-web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MCA9-PHNH] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
158. Id. at 7.
159. Id. at 8.
160. Id. at 9.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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ing toxic chemicals into the Ontario water supply.163
Accordingly, the defendants in the TGS case not only misappropriated
material, non-public information for personal gain, they also misappro-
priated natural resources for personal gain. The issue raised in the case,
of course, was not about environmental law; it was only about securities
law. The court had no occasion to address any of the environmental law
issues raised by the fact pattern. But a consistent application of the princi-
ples of equitable access to resources and the universal destination of
goods would have required a more serious reflection on the economic
and social harm of the misappropriation of both information and the
environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
TGS was more than a case about insider trading. It established the fun-
damental inequity and unfairness of misappropriating resources that are
meant to be shared. Although the Supreme Court initially recoiled from
the extension of equitable principles into the prohibitions of § 10(b), it
slowly but surely incorporated those principles into its evolving insider
trading law. Those principles have much in common with the Pope’s
teachings, particularly his support for the concept of the universal desti-
nation of goods, which recognizes the economic and human benefit of
equal access to valuable resources like information.
163. Id.
